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REVIEWS
FRONTIERS OF SEX DISCRIMINATION LAW
Jessica A. Clarke*
Gender Nonconformity and the Law. By Kimberly A. Yuracko.
New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 2016. Pp. viii, 248.
$85.
Introduction
A short time ago, the argument that discrimination on the basis of sex-
ual orientation is a type of sex discrimination was considered a “risky” tactic
that had achieved “little traction” in litigation.1 One reason was the fear of
backlash from those worried that expanding sex discrimination law so far
would upset all sex classifications, even those on restroom doors.2
The terrain of this debate is shifting rapidly.3 In 2015, the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) interpreted Title VII’s ban on
sex discrimination to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination, for reasons
* Associate Professor of Law and Vance Opperman Research Scholar, University of
Minnesota Law School. I am grateful to Michael Boucai, Mary Anne Case, Jill Hasday, Neha
Jain, and Ezra Young for insightful comments on earlier drafts.
1. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Risky Arguments in Social-Justice Litigation: The Case of Sex
Discrimination and Marriage Equality, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 2087, 2089, 2121 (2014) (discuss-
ing inattention to the argument that bans on same-sex marriage are discrimination on the
basis of sex).
2. See id. at 2133–34, 2133 n.170; Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amend-
ment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 947, 958 (2002) (“Just as the
law of race discrimination removed ‘white’ and ‘colored’ signs from schools and water foun-
tains, so, too, the law of sex discrimination would remove ‘men’ and ‘women’ signs from a
variety of social practices.”).
3. See Mary Anne Case, Legal Protections for the “Personal Best” of Each Employee: Title
VII’s Prohibition on Sex Discrimination, the Legacy of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, and the
Prospect of ENDA, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 1333, 1337–54 (2014) (discussing “recent favorable pro-
gress in the direction of protection against employment discrimination on grounds of sexual
orientation and gender identity in the courts and the EEOC under Title VII”). Federal statutes
forbid discrimination because of “sex” in employment and education. Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (2012); Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012). At present, only twenty states have laws expressly forbid-
ding employment discrimination based on both sexual orientation and gender identity. State-
wide Employment Laws & Policies, Hum. Rts. Campaign (Aug. 25, 2016), http://www.hrc.org/
map/pdf?tid=15 [https://perma.cc/9NMK-2VMU].
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including its assessment that sexual orientation discrimination and harass-
ment “[are] often, if not always, motivated by a desire to enforce heterosexu-
ally defined gender norms.”4 Although the EEOC’s opinion does not bind
federal courts, it has prompted several to reconsider whether sexual orienta-
tion discrimination is a species of sex discrimination.5 In July 2016, the Sev-
enth Circuit observed that district courts were “beginning to question the
doctrinaire distinction between gender nonconformity discrimination and
sexual orientation discrimination and coming up short on rational an-
swers.”6 While it too came up short on rational reasons for the distinction,
the Seventh Circuit was unwilling to disturb its pre–Lawrence v. Texas7
precedents holding that sex and sexual orientation discrimination must be
distinguished.8 That circuit is now reconsidering the issue en banc.9 Other
circuits may soon revisit the question as well.10
On the restroom front, in March 2016, North Carolina passed a law
commonly known as “HB2” requiring that multiple-occupancy restrooms in
schools and public agencies be “designated for and only used by persons
based on their biological sex.”11 In response, the Department of Justice sued
North Carolina to enforce the Obama Administration’s position that federal
laws prohibiting sex discrimination require that individuals be permitted to
4. Baldwin v. Foxx, No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *8 (E.E.O.C. July 15, 2015)
(quoting Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 410 (D. Mass. 2002)).
5. At the time of this writing, four district courts have followed the EEOC’s lead in
holding that sexual orientation discrimination is a form of sex discrimination. EEOC v. Scott
Med. Health Ctr., No. CV 16-225, 2016 WL 6569233, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2016); Winstead
v. Lafayette Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 197 F. Supp. 3d 1334, 1346–47 (N.D. Fla. 2016);
Videckis v. Pepperdine Univ., 150 F. Supp. 3d 1151, 1159–60 (C.D. Cal. 2015); Isaacs v. Felder
Servs., LLC, 143 F. Supp. 3d 1190, 1193 (M.D. Ala. 2015).
6. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698, 703 (7th Cir. 2016), vacated and reh’g en
banc granted, No. 15-1720, 2016 WL 6768628 (7th Cir. Oct. 11, 2016).
7. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that a state may not criminalize private same-sex sexual
relationships between consenting adults).
8. Hively, 830 F.3d at 718 (“Perhaps the writing is on the wall. . . . But writing on the
wall is not enough. Until the writing comes in the form of a Supreme Court opinion or new
legislation, we must adhere to the writing of our prior precedent.”).
9. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., No. 15-1720, 2016 WL 6768628 (7th Cir. Oct. 11,
2016) (granting rehearing en banc).
10. See, e.g., Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 167 F. Supp. 3d 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2016),
appeal docketed, No. 16-748 (2d Cir. Mar. 9, 2016).
11. Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act, Pub. L. No. 2016-3 § 1.3, 2016 N.C. Sess.
Law 3. The statute defines “biological sex” as the designation of male or female on a person’s
birth certificate. Id. Whether an individual can change the sex designation on her birth certifi-
cate depends on the state that issued that birth certificate. See Lisa Mottet, Modernizing State
Vital Statistics Statutes and Policies to Ensure Accurate Gender Markers on Birth Certificates: A
Good Government Approach to Recognizing the Lives of Transgender People, 19 Mich. J. Gender
& L. 373, 381 (2013). Not all states allow changes. Id. at 381–82. Most states that do allow
changes require surgeries that are cost prohibitive or unnecessary for many transgender peo-
ple. See id. at 400–02, 405–10.
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use restrooms in accord with their gender identities.12 Attorney General
Loretta Lynch delivered public remarks condemning North Carolina’s ac-
tion. Addressing the transgender community, she said, “[N]o matter how
isolated or scared you may feel today, the Department of Justice and the
entire Obama Administration wants you to know that we see you; we stand
with you; and we will do everything we can to protect you going forward.”13
Soon after, eleven states brought suit against various federal agencies in a
Texas federal court, seeking to preempt any action to enforce the administra-
tion’s policy.14 This past year also saw important developments in G.G. v.
Gloucester, a case challenging a Virginia school board’s refusal to allow a
transgender boy known by his initials “G.G.” to use the boys’ restroom at
school.15 Last April, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals issued an opinion
deferring to the Department of Education’s position that its regulations re-
quire that schools allow students to use restrooms consistent with their gen-
der identities.16 As a result of that decision, the school board was ordered to
permit G.G. to use the boys’ restroom.17 But the Supreme Court stayed that
order and granted the school board’s petition for certiorari.18 Before the
Supreme Court could decide the case, the Trump Administration withdrew
the Obama Administration’s position on restroom use by transgender stu-
dents.19 Accordingly, the Supreme Court remanded G.G.’s case to the Fourth
12. Complaint, United States v. North Carolina, 192 F. Supp. 3d 620 (M.D.N.C. 2016)
(No. 1:16-cv-00425), 2016 WL 2730796. A number of other parties brought related cases chal-
lenging and defending HB2. Carcan˜o v. McCrory, No. 1:16cv236, 2016 WL 4508192, at *7
(M.D.N.C. Aug. 26, 2016). In August 2016, a district court entered a preliminary injunction
preventing the University of North Carolina from enforcing HB2’s restroom provisions against
certain transgender plaintiffs. Id. at *28–29.
13. Loretta E. Lynch, Attorney General, Remarks at Press Conference Announcing Com-
plaint Against the State of North Carolina to Stop Discrimination Against Transgender Indi-
viduals (May 9, 2016) [hereinafter Lynch Remarks], https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/
attorney-general-loretta-e-lynch-delivers-remarks-press-conference-announcing-complaint
[https://perma.cc/3K65-Q7XL].
14. See Texas v. United States, No. 7:16-CV-00054-O, 2016 WL 4426495 (N.D. Tex. Aug.
21, 2016) (granting a nationwide preliminary injunction to block enforcement of the Obama
Administration policy).
15. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016), vacated
and remanded, No. 16-273, 2017 WL 855755 (U.S. Mar. 6, 2017).
16. Id. at 723.
17. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., No. 4:15CV54, 2016 WL 3581852, at
*1 (E.D. Va. June 23, 2016) (awarding preliminary injunctive relief to G.G. on remand).
18. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 136 S. Ct. 2442 (2016) (staying the
preliminary injunction that would have allowed G.G. to use the boys’ restroom); Gloucester
Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016) (mem.) (granting certiorari).
19. Office for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter from Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights
Sandra Battle, U.S. Dep’t Educ. 1 (Feb. 22, 2017), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/
letters/colleague-201702-title-ix.docx [https://perma.cc/T33F-6CDW] (withdrawing the
Obama Administration’s guidance documents on access to sex-segregated facilities based on
gender identity “in order to further and more completely consider the legal issues involved”).
As a result, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims in Texas v. United States. Plaintiffs’
Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i), Texas v. United
States, No. 7:16-CV-00054-O (N.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2017).
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Circuit so that circuit could reconsider the issues in light of the change in
administration policy.20 It remains uncertain how these recent developments
will affect other pending cases on the restroom question.
Courts, advocates, and commentators grappling with these issues would
do well to consider Kimberly Yuracko’s new book, Gender Nonconformity
and the Law.21 This impressive book offers a rigorous and careful survey of
developments in sex discrimination law over the past three decades, identify-
ing the principles that explain the law’s expansion to protect gender-non-
conforming workers. The book’s starting point is the Supreme Court’s 1989
decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, in which the Court held: “In forbid-
ding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Con-
gress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men
and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”22 Title VII forbids an employer
from acting on gender stereotypes, whether “by assuming or insisting that
[employees] match[ ] the stereotype associated with their group.”23 Thus,
“an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be
aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.”24
Yuracko’s book is concerned with a puzzle. Courts have been willing to
extend Price Waterhouse’s reasoning to men who face discrimination because
they are regarded as effeminate (pp. 18–20), and to individuals who are
targets of bias on account of transgender identities (pp. 21–23). But courts
have stopped short of protecting the “garden-variety gender bender[ ]” in a
series of cases on sex-specific grooming requirements (p. 24). The most no-
table of these is the Ninth Circuit’s 2006 decision in Jespersen v. Harrah’s
Operating Co.25 In that case, Darlene Jespersen, a female bartender at Har-
rah’s casino, sued after the casino implemented a new grooming code re-
quiring that women, but not men, wear makeup.26 Jespersen, by all accounts
a successful bartender, “did not wear makeup on or off the job” because “it
20. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, No. 16-273, 2017 WL 855755 (U.S.
Mar. 6, 2017) (mem.). In G.G., the Supreme Court had granted certiorari on two questions:
(1) whether the letter setting out the agency’s position was owed deference as a matter of
administrative law, and (2) whether, even without deference to the agency’s interpretation, the
school board policy was in violation of Title IX and its implementing regulations. G.G., 137 S.
Ct. at 369; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, at i, Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G. G. ex rel.
Grimm, No. 16-273 (Aug. 29. 2016), 2016 WL 4610979. The Fourth Circuit opinion did not
decide the second question; it rested on deference to the agency. G.G., 822 F.3d at 718–24.
21. Kimberly Yuracko is the Judd and Mary Morris Leighton Professor of Law, North-
western University Pritzker School of Law.
22. 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (plurality opinion) (alteration in original) (quoting L.A.
Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 250.
25. 444 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (“Our settled law in this circuit, . . .
does not support Jespersen’s position that a sex-based difference in appearance standards
alone, without any further showing of disparate effects, creates a prima facie case [of sex
discrimination.]”).
26. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1107.
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would conflict with her self-image.”27 She argued that the new policy would
make her feel demeaned and interfere with her ability to do her work.28 The
court did not see this as sex discrimination.29
Makeup requirements for women might seem to violate the most basic
principle of nondiscrimination—the idea that men and women should be
treated the same. But Yuracko’s book explains how courts reject this neutral-
ity principle when it might disrupt conventional gender norms (pp. 44–46).
Courts refuse to take the thin, formal concept of sex equality to its logical
ends, looking instead to thicker, more socially grounded principles—such as
“antisubordination,” meaning a commitment to dismantling caste-like sys-
tems of hierarchy; “status” protection, meaning the idea that individuals
should not be punished for those aspects of their gender identities that are
immutable; and “perfectionism,”30 meaning, for Yuracko’s purposes, the
promotion of intellectual flourishing and human development (pp. 9–10).
Courts regard makeup requirements as trivial requests for workplace con-
formity, not as affronts to any deeper principle. By contrast, transgender
individuals are more likely to win their cases because courts regard gender
identity as immutable—a medical condition that an individual cannot
change (pp. 92–95). The same goes for those effeminate men who are penal-
ized for their “way of being in the world” in terms of mannerisms and be-
havior—aspects of personality that cannot be changed in the same way a
worker might change clothes (p. 99).
Gender Nonconformity and the Law’s primary contribution is to map out
the principles underlying sex discrimination doctrine. Not only does this
map lead to solutions to doctrinal puzzles,31 it also allows readers to under-
take their own normative assessments of the “often inexplicit values and
beliefs” that might guide the expansion of sex discrimination law to new
frontiers (p. 174). Although there is a voluminous literature on the law of
sex stereotyping, no other work offers a comparable level of comprehension
in explaining the principles that run through the law of gender noncon-
formity. Yuracko’s book is to be commended for embracing the complexity
of this area of law while offering readers clarity and insight.
While description, rather than normative analysis, is the book’s main
goal, it sounds a cautionary note about status-protection arguments (pp.
7–8). The premise that sex equality means the right to live in accord with
27. Id. at 1107–08.
28. Id. at 1108.
29. Id. at 1112.
30. Yuracko refers to “perfectionism” not in the ordinary sense of that term, but as it is
used in political philosophy. See infra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.
31. This Review will focus on Yuracko’s analysis of the puzzle presented by Jespersen. But
readers may also wish to consult this book for its insightful answers to two other vexing ques-
tions in sex discrimination law: (1) why the law of sex discrimination has expanded while the
law of race discrimination remains stagnant, pp. 150–169, and (2) why courts extend the bona
fide occupational qualification defense to jobs that involve, as their main task, sexual titillation
or privacy, but not to employer efforts to sexualize jobs that entail some other main task, such
as waiting tables or working as a flight attendant, pp. 71–87, 115–36.
814 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 115:809
one’s immutable masculine or feminine identity imperils the legal claims of
those who, like Darlene Jespersen, seek to defy some of the expectations for
feminine behavior without transitioning to a masculine gender identity (pp.
104–05). Worse still, it reinforces the idea that traditional gender identities
are innate and natural, the inevitable causes of social practices of gender
segregation rather than their effects (pp. 108–09). Yuracko argues that, as
courts increasingly require plaintiffs to prove that their gender identities are
“fixed, stable, and legally meaningful” to achieve protection, they shut down
a “wider range of gender possibilities that might lead to more personally
fulfilling lives for individuals and more creative and adaptable environments
in the workplace” (p. 174).
This Review will make use of the principles skillfully mapped out in
Gender Nonconformity and the Law to chart the course of legal developments
for LGBT plaintiffs occurring after the book was written. It will ask whether
these developments should worry those who seek to expand the social space
for gender creativity beyond conventional masculinity and femininity. Part I
summarizes Yuracko’s typology of theories of gender nondiscrimination,
discusses her argument that this body of law is on a trajectory toward pro-
tecting status, and explains why the status-protection theory is troubling.
Part II examines how these theories have played out in recent cases ex-
panding sex discrimination law to protect against more forms of anti-LGBT
discrimination. Yuracko’s prescient book offers tools that help explain why
sex discrimination arguments have gone from nonstarters to front runners
for LGBT rights.
Part II also asks whether the recent cases have continued on the precari-
ous trajectory of status protection. It concludes that status-protection argu-
ments are receding into the background while recent cases emphasize ideas
based on neutrality and antisubordination instead. In the transgender rights
cases, courts and advocates are foregrounding neutrality arguments bol-
stered with claims about social stigma that sound in antisubordination theo-
ries. These arguments take aim at sex-based classifications that stigmatize
transgender people as unworthy of equal concern or respect. Status-based
arguments about the immutability of gender identity still appear, generally
in response to restroom privacy concerns, but they receive less emphasis. In
the cases brought by lesbian and gay plaintiffs, courts are growing increas-
ingly dissatisfied with what they perceive as unfair asymmetries in protec-
tion. These courts are turning to neutrality arguments combined with the
understanding that systems of subordination based on sex and sexual orien-
tation intersect. These new arguments do not rest on the premise that gen-
der identity or sexual orientation should be protected because it is an
immutable status. But it remains to be seen whether these developments will
pave the way toward a more gender-creative future.
April 2017] Frontiers of Sex Discrimination Law 815
I. Mapping Out Principles of Gender Nondiscrimination
Explaining puzzling cases such as Jespersen is the primary task of
Yuracko’s book. It does so by identifying five principles—neutrality, an-
tisubordination, status, perfectionism, and expressive freedom—and tracing
them through the doctrine. While legal scholarship has long emphasized
that sex-stereotyping doctrine protects equality and autonomy,32 no other
work has so carefully explicated the many variations on these principles that
have guided judicial decisions over the past three decades. One of this book’s
many virtues is that it is decidedly uninterested in devising a unified field
theory of sex discrimination to neatly explain every legal result. Recognizing
the impossibility of such a task, the book embraces the theoretical pluralism
that makes patterns difficult to discern in this area of the law, and then
carefully reveals the theories at work in creating those patterns. It subjects
each potential theory to the test of how it might explain the case law, re-
vealing each explanation’s analytical power and limits. In the course of this
project, Yuracko demonstrates an enviable ability to select illustrative facts—
both real and hypothetical. Although normative analysis is not the book’s
main purpose, it assesses the normative potential of each of the theories vis-
a`-vis one another and our instincts about what sort of treatment is fair. This
Part will offer a brief summary of Yuracko’s explanation of these five
principles.
Neutrality. The most obvious principle to explain the law of gender
nonconformity is neutrality: that likes should be treated alike, or in other
words, similarly situated women and men should be treated the same (p.
28). Yuracko argues persuasively that this principle’s reach is limited in cer-
tain trait-based discrimination cases: those in which “a woman [is] penal-
ized for possessing a trait that a man is not penalized for possessing, and
vice versa” (p. 33). In such circumstances, the principle of neutrality yields
indeterminate results, because its outcome “depends on how one names the
relevant trait at issue and frames the cross-sex comparison” (p. 33). For
example, consider a woman fired due to physical limitations resulting from
her pregnancy. No male trait is precisely the same as pregnancy, so courts
must draw analogies to find similarly situated men. But what sort of condi-
tions that might disable men are comparable to pregnancy? (p. 36). On-the-
job or off-the-job injuries?33 These questions are “conceptually ambiguous,
politically loaded, and outcome determinative” (p. 37). This indeterminacy
is not limited to biological conditions, because “[i]n a sexist society, virtually
32. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Stan-
dards, Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2541, 2580–82 (1994)
(“[I]t is clear that on both an individual level and with respect to women as a whole, dress and
appearance have important, albeit complicated, autonomy and equality implications.”); Mary
Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in
the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 Yale L.J. 1, 2 (1995) (“Were [the] distinct meaning of
gender to be recaptured in the law, great gains both in analytic clarity and in human liberty
and equality might well result.”).
33. See Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1348–49 (2015).
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nothing done by men and women has precisely the same meaning” (p. 42).
Consider a female newscaster fired for failing to meet her network’s stan-
dards of attractiveness.34 How is she to prove that a man with the same level
of attractiveness received preferential treatment, if the concept of attractive-
ness is distorted by gendered social meanings, such that comparisons are
apples to oranges? (p. 42).
Sometimes the principle of neutrality takes another form—not insisting
on apples-to-apples comparisons, but rather, disapproving of explicit sex-
based classifications (p. 44). In the years following the enactment of Title
VII, courts relied on this anticlassification principle to invalidate rules ex-
pressly excluding women from difficult or dangerous jobs (pp. 31–32). But
courts do not pursue the anticlassification theory to its logical ends. A long
series of cases accept sex-based grooming rules such as those at issue in
Jespersen. The burdens of such requirements are viewed as insignificant in
comparison to “the perceived value of protecting comfortable gender con-
ventions” (p. 45). As a normative matter, Yuracko questions neutrality as a
guiding principle of equality law (p. 47). She tells the story of Shannon
Faulkner, the first female cadet at the Citadel, who received the buzz haircut
required of all recruits (pp. 48–50). Yuracko sympathizes with the argument
that, “while the meaning of the buzz cut on a man is an acceptable mascu-
linity, on a woman it denotes an unacceptable and strange masculinity at
odds with appropriate gender norms.”35 She also argues that if employers are
not permitted to implement sex-specific grooming codes, they may narrow
the options available to both sexes to those considered professionally accept-
able for either sex, with the result of a coerced androgyny that comes at the
cost of individual liberty.36
Antisubordination. The antisubordination theory posits that the aim of
equality law is to dismantle caste-like social hierarchies (p. 54). An-
tisubordination goes far to explain cases such as Jespersen. On an an-
tisubordination theory, courts are not troubled by the fact that grooming
policies may formally differentiate between men and women. Rather, they
ask whether those grooming policies perpetuate patterns of social stratifica-
tion that give men systematic advantages over women. Thus, courts are
likely to disturb sex-specific grooming codes if they impose unequal burdens
34. Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1209 (8th Cir. 1985).
35. P. 48. The Faulkner case was in the 1990s, and it is important to note that the social
meaning of a buzz cut on a woman is dependent on time, place, and context. See, e.g., Marlen
Komar, 43 Women With Super Short & Buzzed Hair Who Define Their Own Femininity, Bustle
(Mar. 10, 2016), https://www.bustle.com/articles/142730-43-women-with-super-short-buzzed-
hair-who-define-their-own-femininity-photos [https://perma.cc/NBJ9-G4VF] (collecting testi-
monials from social media regarding women’s varied experiences of having short haircuts).
36. P. 52. For example, rather than allowing all workers to choose whether to have short
or long hair, employers who are uncomfortable with male employees with long hair might
require both men and women to have short hair. See p. 52. Which result is more likely is an
empirical question. It is also debatable whether the harm to those who would protest androg-
yny (such as women who prefer long hair) outweighs the harm to those who would protest
gender conformity (such as women who prefer short hair).
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by stigmatizing women (pp. 62–63). For example, a requirement that
women, but not men, wear special uniforms might give the impression that
women are of “lesser professional status than their male colleagues.”37 By
contrast, courts see no stigmatic harm in requirements that reflect conven-
tional gender norms such as the makeup rule in Jespersen, because the idea
that women should wear makeup is regarded as mundane and benign.38
Courts may also invalidate gender performance demands that place women
in a “double bind” in which conformity with feminine standards is at odds
with the demands of the professional role (p. 64). For example, “[a]n em-
ployer who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose positions require
this trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible catch–22: out of
a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not.”39 But there’s
no catch–22 for female bartenders asked to wear makeup, because judges
believe that makeup will help bartenders better appeal to customers (p. 65).
Despite the limits of the antisubordination approach, Yuracko regards the
theory’s impact as “sweeping” in “gaining women access to jobs throughout
the economy and encouraging a critical take on social gender norms” (p.
88).
Expressive Freedom. Yuracko devotes a short chapter to the principle of
freedom to express one’s gender identity, which she argues has not been,
and should not be, accepted by courts. This is because “[t]rue gender free-
dom is both conceptually complex and practically costly” (pp. 143–44).
What if a bartender claimed that the requirement that she smile at custom-
ers was inconsistent with her surly masculine gender identity?40 Based on
what principles would a court determine whether smiling is an aspect of
gender? As Yuracko explains, “It is impossible to structure protection in a
way that both relies on the category of gender and simultaneously tran-
scends any conventional understanding of it” (p. 146). If this principle were
to require that employers accommodate all employees’ gender expressions, it
would cause major economic disruption, because a wide variety of jobs re-
quire attributes considered masculine or feminine, such as being tough or
having a nurturing demeanor (p. 146).
Status. A status-based principle would protect individuals from discrim-
ination based on immutable traits, defined as those an individual cannot
control (pp. 89, 92). A status theory would not protect an individual’s lib-
erty to express her gender in any way that she would prefer; rather, it would
save her from demands that she alter aspects of her identity that she cannot
control. This theory explains why courts have been particularly solicitous of
37. P. 62 (quoting Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Chi., 604 F.2d 1028, 1033
(7th Cir. 1979)).
38. See p. 63.
39. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (plurality opinion).
40. Pp. 145–46. This hypothetical assumes that the female bartender did not argue that
her employer fired female but not male bartenders for failing to smile at customers. Such
disparate treatment would offend the neutrality and antisubordination principles, among
others.
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the claims of plaintiffs who present medical evidence that they experience
gender identity disorder (GID), or gender dysphoria.41 Courts imagine that
gender dysphoria means that the plaintiff “has the soul of a female in the
body of a male,” or vice versa.42 On this theory, gender is the new sex. The
biological, binary, and fixed concept of sex determined by genitalia or genet-
ics is being eclipsed by the biological, binary, and fixed concept of gender
identity, determined by the psyche or soul.
While Yuracko favors the expansion of Title VII to cover transgender
plaintiffs (p. 174), she is concerned about the dangerous normative implica-
tions of the status-protection theory.43 “The danger flows from courts’ will-
ingness to entrench and essentialize traditional concepts of gender in the
course of providing new protection for nontraditional plaintiffs” (p. 90).
The principle gives workers incentives to perform their gender dysphoria by
convincing courts that their personalities, aspirations, and behaviors are en-
tirely masculine or feminine (p. 105). Those individuals constructing hybrid,
androgynous, or other creatively gendered selves have no chance at legal
recognition. “If . . . courts believe that women have female souls and that
such souls require women to wear stereotypically feminine clothing, then the
pain of women like Jespersen, who seek to challenge some but not all femi-
nine gender conventions, will always be invisible” (p. 108). Moreover, if the
law imagines each person has a masculine or feminine soul, it will not see
the role of the workplace in producing gender norms. Courts will accept
arguments that women are underrepresented in traditionally
male–dominated jobs because women are inherently uninterested in mascu-
line work. They will not imagine that workplaces might engage in discrimi-
nation that limits women’s expectations and aspirations.44
41. See pp. 93, 201 n.13. The American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic Statistical
Manual has reclassified “gender identity disorder” as “gender dysphoria,” to “reflect[ ] a
change in conceptualization of the disorder’s defining features by emphasizing the phenome-
non of ‘gender incongruence’ rather than cross-gender identification per se.” See Am. Psychi-
atric Ass’n, Highlights of Changes from DSM-IV-TR to DSM-5, at 14 (2013), http://
www.dsm5.org/documents/changes%20from%20dsm-iv-tr%20to%20dsm-5.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/9D4C-KFDW]. This change is meant to clarify that “[t]he experienced gender incon-
gruence and resulting gender dysphoria may take many forms.” Id.
42. P. 106 (quoting Doe ex rel. Doe v. Yunits, No. 00-1060A, 2001 WL 36648072, at *1
(Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2001)).
43. P. 102. I share this concern, and have written elsewhere against immutability as a
theory of discrimination law, arguing that, in addition to essentializing identity, it “often rests
on untenable, harsh, intrusive, and stigmatizing judgments about the traits for which individ-
uals should receive blame.” Jessica A. Clarke, Against Immutability, 125 Yale L.J. 2, 33 (2015).
Moreover, discussions of immutability inappropriately focus attention on whether victims of
discrimination should be shamed, rather than whether their mistreatment is a practice that
perpetuates systematic inequality on the basis of traits such as race, sex, or disability. Id. at 85.
44. P. 108 (discussing Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial In-
terpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest
Argument, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1749 (1990)). This argument might point to another principle at
work: an antiessentialist idea that challenges the assumption that women and men are funda-
mentally different as workers. See Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex Discrimination Seriously, 91 Denv.
U. L. Rev. 995, 1109–10 (2015). This principle understands sex stereotypes as self-fulfilling
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Perfectionism. Yuracko describes one additional theory that may have
some explanatory force in the law of gender nonconformity: a theory of
perfectionism, as that term is used in political philosophy (pp. 112–15). At a
general level, perfectionism “is the view that some ways of life are intrinsi-
cally better than others, and that the state may appropriately act to promote
these better ways of life.”45 Importantly for Yuracko’s account, perfectionism
would entail “a belief in the importance for human flourishing of one’s self-
development and social treatment as an intellectual, rational actor.”46
Human flourishing is threatened when workers, particularly women, are
treated as sexual objects rather than intellectual subjects. Yuracko argues,
based on empirical evidence, that sexualization of women impedes their
workplace opportunities and intellectual development (pp. 128–36). This
principle explains why, apart from work that is exclusively related to sex,
such as pornography, courts balk at efforts by employers to use women’s
sexuality to sell goods and services (pp. 118–28). This principle also helps to
explain why courts do not extend sex discrimination law to override, for
example, a female patient’s desire to have a female healthcare provider in the
interests of sexual privacy (pp. 117–18). Yuracko’s perfectionism chapter has
more of a normative bent than the others. But, perhaps recognizing the di-
vergence of feminist views on the harms of commodified sexuality, she clari-
fies that her goal is not a full-throated defense of a perfectionist principle (or
any other principle). Rather, she seeks “to uncover the values at work so that
they can be subjected to broader social analysis, review, and debate” (p.
136). In this regard, the book is certainly a success.
II. The Path of Recent LGBT Rights Developments
Yuracko’s prescient book offers essential tools for understanding and
critiquing recent developments in sex discrimination doctrine. As the legis-
lative movement to clarify the law has stalled, courts and administrative
agencies have been pushing the boundaries of the law of gender noncon-
formity to prohibit all anti-LGBT discrimination. These courts and agencies
almost invariably point out that, while anti-LGBT discrimination may not
have been the “principal evil” envisioned by Title VII, “statutory prohibi-
tions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable
prophecies that limit all workers’ aspirations and opportunities. Id. at 1106. Yuracko might
understand this idea as a variation on neutrality or perfectionist ideas. In any event, her book
does not purport to identify every principle at work in this complex area of the law.
45. Pp. 112–13 (quoting Andrew Koppelman, The Fluidity of Neutrality, 66 Rev. Pol.
633, 634 (2004)).
46. P. 126. Perfectionism might entail other directions for antidiscrimination law as well.
See, e.g., Kimberly A. Yuracko, Perfectionism and Contemporary Feminist Values
(2003); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Perfectionism, Pies and the Politics of Job Qualifications, 12 Rev. J.
Pol. Phil. 15 (2016) (reviewing Joseph Fishkin, Bottlenecks: A New Theory of Equal
Opportunity (2014)). Gender Nonconformity and the Law focuses on the threat sexualization
poses to intellectual development and opportunity.
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evils.”47 In the spirit of Yuracko’s careful reading of case law, this Part will
examine these most recent cases and ask whether they have continued on a
troubling trajectory of status protection. It will discuss, in turn, how these
cases reflect and refract commitments to neutrality, status protection, and
antisubordination.48
A. Neutrality
The EEOC and other federal agencies have advanced neutrality-based
arguments that anti-LGBT discrimination is per se sex discrimination, and
courts have increasingly accepted these arguments. Yet, as a reader of
Yuracko’s book might predict, neutrality arguments sometimes prove inde-
terminate and run up against entrenched gender norms.
The EEOC regards anti-LGBT bias as sex discrimination per se, because
it violates the principle of formal equality. In a case involving discrimination
against Mia Macy, a transgender woman, the EEOC reasoned:
[I]f [Macy] can prove that the reason that she did not get the job . . . is that
the Director was willing to hire her when he thought she was a man, but
was not willing to hire her once he found out that she was now a woman—
she will have proven that the Director discriminated on the basis of sex.49
With respect to sexual orientation, the EEOC reasons similarly, posing the
hypothetical of an employer who “suspends a lesbian employee for display-
ing a photo of her female spouse on her desk, but does not suspend a male
employee for displaying a photo of his female spouse on his desk.”50 If a
plaintiff can prove she would have received better treatment if she were a
he—that’s sex discrimination.
As Yuracko explains, this formal logic suffers from “nominalism”
problems (pp. 36–37). How one names the trait that was the reason for the
47. See, e.g., Winstead v. Lafayette Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 197 F. Supp. 3d 1334, 1347
(N.D. Fla. 2016) (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79–80
(1998)).
48. Consistent with Yuracko’s assessment, arguments premised on expressive freedom
are not doing the work here. Expressive freedom is more likely to be deployed as a straw figure
by opponents of expanded rights. For example, in one recent Title VII case, a district judge
characterized the EEOC’s argument as one that the plaintiff “be allowed to wear a skirt-suit in
order to express [her] gender identity,” rather than as a claim for sex equality. EEOC v. R.G. &
G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., No. 14-13710, 2016 WL 4396083, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 18,
2016) (emphasis added), appeal docketed, No. 16-2424 (6th Cir. Oct. 13, 2016). This character-
ization allowed the court to see the dispute in terms of conflicting liberties—the employer’s
religious freedom against the employee’s freedom of expression—and to rule in favor of the
employer. Id. Courts may be more likely to defer to the employer’s liberty interests when value
on the other side of the scale is the employee’s liberty interest rather than her right to equality.
Cf. Clarke, supra note 43, at 50–52 (arguing that when “gay rights are cast as liberties, rather
than questions of equality” those rights claims are less likely to overcome objections based on
religious freedom, because “[w]hen the values at stake sound in the same register, accommo-
dation seems more reasonable.”).
49. Macy v. Holder, No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *10 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 20, 2012).
50. Baldwin v. Foxx, No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *5 (E.E.O.C. July 15, 2015).
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discrimination—sex or LGBT status—determines the result of the logical
exercise. Employers might argue that they treat transgender men and
women the same: had Macy been a man assigned the female sex at birth,
rather than a woman assigned the male sex, “he” would have faced the same
anti-trans discrimination.51 Likewise, with respect to the hypothetical mar-
ried lesbian, one court responded that homosexuality, not sex, was the basis
for the employer’s discrimination, because the employee would have been
fired had she been a gay man with a photo of his male spouse on his desk, or
a bisexual person with a picture of a spouse of any sex.52
To add persuasive force to its neutrality arguments, the EEOC draws
analogies to religion and race. It argues that Supreme Court precedent re-
quires that every protected trait (race, sex, religion, and so forth) be treated
the same.53 Just as it is discrimination on the basis of religion to punish the
convert, so should it be discrimination on the basis of sex to fire an em-
ployee because of a gender transition.54 But those in doubt might ask, is this
the right comparison? Does the law prohibit discrimination on the basis of
religion for the same reason as discrimination on the basis of sex? Might it
protect the religious convert in the interest of ensuring freedom of con-
science? Is gender an issue of conscience?55 With respect to sexual orienta-
tion, the EEOC argues that just as it is discrimination on the basis of race to
fire an employee for an interracial relationship, so too is it discrimination on
the basis of sex to fire an employee for her same-sex relationship.56 But those
in doubt might ask whether opposition to interracial relationships, which is
part and parcel of the ideology of white supremacy, is the same as opposi-
tion to same-sex relationships. Is opposition to same-sex relationships pre-
mised on a view of male supremacy?57 Neutrality cannot answer these deeper
51. On the other hand, a plaintiff might show that women and men are treated differ-
ently by presenting evidence that women have the latitude to dress as men, but men are not
permitted to dress as women. Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Tr. Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215–16 (1st Cir.
2000) (holding that it would have been sex discrimination for a bank to “treat, for credit
purposes, a woman who dresses like a man differently than a man who dresses like a woman”).
52. Winstead, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 1344 (“Imagine now that the female employee is bisex-
ual. She is married to a man, and her co-worker—who we will assume is heterosexual—is
married to a woman. Each keeps a picture of their spouse on their desk. The female employee
is suspended not for displaying a photo of her spouse, but rather for being bisexual.”). Win-
stead would not accept the neutrality argument, but it did accept the argument that “sexual
orientation discrimination is a cognizable form of sex discrimination because it falls under the
category of gender stereotype discrimination.” Id. at 1344–47.
53. Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *7 (“Title VII ‘on its face treats each of the enumer-
ated categories’—race, color, religion, sex, and national origin—‘exactly the same.’ ” (quoting
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 243 n.9 (1989))).
54. Macy, 2012 WL 1435995, at *11 (citing Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293,
306 (D.D.C. 2008)).
55. For an argument that it is, see, for example, David B. Cruz, Disestablishing Sex and
Gender, 90 Calif. L. Rev. 997, 1005–06 (2002).
56. Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *6–7.
57. For an argument that it is, see, for example, Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination
Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 197, 234–35 (1994).
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questions. Some thicker understanding of the wrong of gender discrimina-
tion is required to make these analogies plausible to skeptics.
As a separate inquiry, some courts ask whether anti-LGBT bias involves
impermissible sex stereotyping because it requires, as a first step, that the
discriminator classify the plaintiff by sex.58 One court, while rejecting neu-
trality arguments, still agreed that animus on the basis of sexual orientation,
“whatever its origin, is at its core based on disapproval of certain behaviors
(real or assumed) and tendencies towards behaviors, and those behaviors are
disapproved of precisely because they are deemed to be ‘inappropriate’ for
members of a certain sex or gender.”59
Other courts refuse this anticlassification argument and return to neu-
trality-based thinking about whether men and women are treated the same.
In Hively, the Seventh Circuit panel put the plaintiff to the task of proving
that anti-gay bias could never be based on sex-neutral ideas.60 It speculated
that anti-gay bias might sometimes be based on “prejudicial or stereotypical
ideas about particular aspects of the gay and lesbian ‘lifestyle,’ including
ideas about promiscuity, religious beliefs, spending habits, child-rearing,
sexual practices, or politics.”61 Recent decisions have not insisted on the
same showing for transgender plaintiffs, even though transphobia could hy-
pothetically result from similar purportedly sex-neutral ideas. The reasons
for this distinction are unclear; perhaps courts imagine that homophobia is
driven by opposition to same-sex sexuality, a social phenomenon distinct
from gender bias, and they do not imagine opposition to same-sex sexuality
motivating anti-trans bias.
Yuracko’s book suggests courts may balk at an anticlassification argu-
ment that would forbid any sex- or gender-based reasoning because, if taken
seriously, this rule would challenge all sex-based distinctions and gender
roles, even those that are conventional and “comforting.”62 While some may
regard the aspiration of race discrimination law as a “colorblind” society in
which skin color is no more socially meaningful than eye color, many abhor
the idea of a sex-blind society.63 These concerns may take the shape of fears
58. Courts sometimes divide the neutrality argument and the stereotyping argument
into two separate questions. See, e.g., Winstead v. Lafayette Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 197 F.
Supp. 3d 1334, 1343–47 (N.D. Fla. 2016).
59. Id. at 1346.
60. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698, 709–10 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Although it
seems likely that most of the causes of discrimination based on sexual orientation ultimately
stem from employers’ and co-workers’ discomfort with a lesbian woman’s or a gay man’s
failure to abide by gender norms, we cannot say that it must be so in all cases.”), vacated and
reh’g en banc granted, No. 15-1720, 2016 WL 6768628 (7th Cir. Oct. 11, 2016).
61. Id. at 709. Whether any of these reasons for bias, if investigated, would prove sex
neutral or independent of sex-role stereotyping is unlikely.
62. P. 46. Suzanne Goldberg has articulated a variation on this argument: “More graphi-
cally, it is almost as though there is an internalized sense, on the part of at least some judges,
that if sex-based rules were not tolerated on occasion, we would all wind up in unisex tunics,
having lost our sexed and gendered bearings.” Goldberg, supra note 1, at 2133. She argues that
“this fetishization of the law’s power over identity” explains cases like Jespersen. Id.
63. See Siegel, supra note 2, at 956–59.
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of a world of unisex restrooms where women are made vulnerable to male
sexual predators, must put up with filth, and lose the “female sociability” of
their own private gendered spaces.64 The strong anticlassification argument
may raise concerns about an enforced androgyny that squelches benign gen-
der difference or assimilates all to rules that, while facially neutral, are pre-
mised on, and privilege, male experiences, such as a rule requiring both
male and female recruits to receive buzz haircuts (p. 48).
Similar concerns have arisen in the HB2 district court’s analysis of the
transgender plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction to allow those
plaintiffs to use restrooms consistent with their gender identities.65 To win a
preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must show she is likely to succeed on the
merits.66 Although the court concluded, in light of the precedent established
by G.G., that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their Title
IX claim,67 it did not reach the same conclusion on their claim that the
North Carolina restroom law is a sex classification that violates equal protec-
tion.68 What seems to be driving this analysis is a concern about how far the
anticlassification argument might extend. Under equal protection doctrine, a
sex classification is justified if it is substantially related to an important gov-
ernment objective.69 The district court concluded that the state had an im-
portant interest in protecting bodily privacy by segregating restrooms based
on genitalia70 rather than gender identity.71 It cited the Supreme Court’s case
integrating the Virginia Military Academy for the proposition that privacy
concerns are related to the fact that “[p]hysical differences between men and
women . . . are enduring” and the “two sexes are not fungible.”72 The district
court noted that the law recognizes physical differences between the sexes in
64. See Mary Anne Case, Why Not Abolish Laws of Urinary Segregation?, in Toilet: Pub-
lic Restrooms and the Politics of Sharing 211, 219 (Harvey Molotch & Laura Nore´n
eds., 2010). Case points out that there is no data to support the claim that unisex restrooms
increase crime. Id. at 220. She also argues that the “flip side” of the argument that the women’s
restroom should be a “safe space” for female sociability is that “the men’s room in some
environments can function as something like the executive washroom.” Id. at 219–24. I am not
aware of data to support the stereotype that men are less sanitary in the restroom, and some
expert opinions on the question are to the contrary. See, e.g., Mary Schmich, Sharing Bathroom
with Men Raises Question of Cleanliness, Chi. Trib. (Jan. 29, 2016, 5:02 AM), http://www
.chicagotribune.com/news/columnists/schmich/ct-gender-neutral-bathroom-mary-schmich-
0129-20160128-column.html [https://perma.cc/NSP6-FC22] (quoting the owner of a com-
mercial cleaning service as saying that the women’s restroom is dirtier “hands down”).
65. See Carcan˜o v. McCrory, No. 1:16cv236, 2016 WL 4508192, at *1 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 26,
2016).
66. Id. at *10.
67. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing G.G.).
68. Carcan˜o, 2016 WL 4508192, at *11–26.
69. See id. at *17.
70. Technically, the North Carolina law relies on birth certificates rather than genitalia,
but the court thought that the birth certificate sex designation was a reasonable proxy for
genitalia. Id. at *20.
71. Id. at *18.
72. Id. (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)).
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allowing different physical fitness standards to be applied to male and female
job applicants.73 It found persuasive the plaintiffs’ concession that the state
had an interest in “ensuring that ‘12-year-old girls who are not familiar with
male anatomy’ are not exposed to male genitalia by” adults in restrooms.74
This concern did not have sufficient force to defeat the motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction, however, because prior to HB2, public agencies had allowed
transgender individuals to use restrooms consistent with their gender identi-
ties through a process of “case-by-case . . . accommodat[ion]” without any
privacy-related problems.75 While the court may have been concerned about
the implications of a ruling that would void all sex classifications, it was
comfortable with this case-by-case approach.
Nonetheless, the argument that anti-LGBT discrimination violates the
principle of sex neutrality is making headway, forcing arguments about
whether there are any permissible sex classifications into the realms of de-
fenses and exemptions.76
B. Status Protection
Are these recent cases guided by the principle that LGBT workers and
students must be protected because gender identity is immutable? Should
those who seek to expand the social space for gender creativity be alarmed?
The influence of immutability (or “status” protection, to use Yuracko’s
term) in recent cases is complicated. In the cases brought by transgender
plaintiffs, status-based arguments are made intentionally in response to rest-
room privacy concerns, but their effect is not necessarily to entrench essen-
tialist concepts of gender. In the sexual orientation cases, status-based
arguments are peripheral or absent. And courts are growing dissatisfied with
how the doctrine inadvertently promotes essentialist stereotypes about the
correspondence of gender nonconformity and lesbian, gay, and bisexual
orientations.
Many of the recent transgender rights cases mention medical under-
standings of gender identity only as background facts, if at all. The EEOC’s
2012 Macy opinion did not refer to any medical evidence about the plain-
tiff’s gender identity.77 Like most of the recent cases, it used the term “trans-
gender,”78 which refers to people whose gender identities differ from the
73. Id. at *19 (citing Bauer v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 340, 350 (4th Cir. 2016)).
74. Id. at *20.
75. Id. at *7.
76. See, e.g., EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., No. 14-13710, 2016 WL
4396083, at *1–2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 18, 2016) (concluding that an employer’s sex-differentiated
dress code was an impermissible form of sex discrimination, but holding that the employer
was exempt from suit under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act), appeal docketed, No. 16-
2424 (6th Cir. Oct. 13, 2016).
77. Macy v. Holder, No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *1 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 20, 2012)
(mentioning only that the plaintiff was “a transgender woman” who was, at the time of the
alleged discrimination, “in the process of transitioning from male to female”).
78. Id.
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gender identity “typically associated with the sex they were assigned at
birth.”79 The umbrella term “transgender” has eclipsed the narrower term
“transsexual,” which refers to people who have changed, or wish to change,
their bodies through hormones or surgeries.80 This shift in nomenclature
recognizes more diversity in gender-nonconforming people, although it does
not reject the view that gender identity is immutable. To be sure, most fed-
eral appeals court cases on whether anti-trans discrimination is sex discrimi-
nation involved plaintiffs who cast their conditions in medical terms and
expressed the desire to live all aspects of their lives as either male or female.81
And yet, these opinions do not rely on any status-related reasoning to reach
their holdings. One of the most recent, the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in
Glenn v. Brumby, even seems to eschew it. There, the plaintiff raised two
claims, one alleging sex discrimination and one alleging that her employer
discriminated against her due to her medical condition.82 The court accepted
the sex discrimination argument,83 but did not reach the medical-condition
question.84 Rather than limiting protection to those with GID, the court held
that “[a]ll persons, whether transgender or not, are protected from discrimi-
nation on the basis of gender stereotype.”85 Thus, these cases do not dictate
the result in Jespersen.86 They do not hold that a woman cannot object to a
makeup requirement unless she has the soul of a man. In terms of avoiding
status arguments, the sex discrimination route to protection has advantages
79. GLAAD Media Reference Guide—Transgender, GLAAD, https://www.glaad.org/refer
ence/transgender [https://perma.cc/C468-96DG]. Advocates generally recommend avoidance
of terms such as pre- and postoperative, which imply that all transgender people wish to, or
ought to have surgery. Id.
80. Id.
81. Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1314 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Since puberty, Glenn has
felt that she is a woman, and in 2005, she was diagnosed with GID, a diagnosis listed in the
American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.”);
Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 733 (6th Cir. 2005) (beginning the opinion with
the explanation that the plaintiff “was living as a pre-operative male-to-female transsexual”);
Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 568 (6th Cir. 2004) (“After being diagnosed with GID,
Smith began ‘expressing a more feminine appearance on a full-time basis’—including at
work—in accordance with international medical protocols for treating GID.”); Schwenk v.
Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Schwenk considered herself a transsexual
and . . . she planned to seek sex reassignment surgery in the future.”). A 2000 First Circuit case
often cited as recognizing transgender rights simply held that discrimination against a man for
wearing women’s attire could be impermissible sex stereotyping under Price Waterhouse, with
no discussion of any medical evidence, whether the plaintiff’s gender identity was female, or
whether he was in the process of transition. Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Tr. Co., 214 F.3d 213,
215–16 (1st Cir. 2000) (denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss).
82. Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1314.
83. Id. at 1316 (“[D]iscriminating against someone on the basis of his or her gender
non-conformity constitutes sex-based discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.”).
84. Id. at 1314, 1321.
85. Id. at 1318.
86. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
826 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 115:809
over a litigation strategy that would seek a ruling that transgender individu-
als are themselves a “suspect class.” One of the traditional factors in deter-
mining suspect class status is whether a trait is immutable.87 The sex
discrimination argument bypasses that inquiry.88
Status considerations come to the surface as transgender plaintiffs ad-
vance arguments that they should be treated as women or men for purposes
of using sex-segregated restrooms and changing facilities.89 In G.G. v.
Gloucester, the legal question was whether, under a regulation allowing
schools to segregate restrooms based on sex, schools should determine a
student’s sex based on “genitalia” or “gender identity.”90 G.G. sought a pre-
liminary injunction requiring the school to allow him to use the boys’ rest-
room.91 This required that he demonstrate that the balance of hardships
tipped in his favor.92 To do so, G.G. argued that he had been diagnosed with
gender dysphoria, “a medical condition characterized by clinically signifi-
cant distress caused by an incongruence between a person’s gender identity
and the person’s birth-assigned sex”; that he had changed his name to a
“traditionally male name”; and that he now “lives all aspects of his life as a
boy.”93 He had also undergone hormone therapy, although he had not un-
dergone sex reassignment surgery.94 To use the girls’ restroom would cause
him hardship because it would be inconsistent with his treatment for gender
87. See Kevin M. Barry et al., A Bare Desire to Harm: Transgender People and the Equal
Protection Clause, 57 B.C. L. Rev. 507, 559 (2016) (analyzing the immutability argument for
transgender status).
88. See, e.g., Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1316 (holding that discrimination based on “gender non-
conformity constitutes sex-based discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause” without
assessing whether gender identity is immutable). But see Evancho v. Pine-Richland Sch. Dist.,
No. CV 2:16-01537, 2017 WL 770619, at *13 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2017) (reasoning that “gender
identity is entirely akin to ‘sex’ as that term has been customarily used in the Equal Protection
analysis” because gender identity “is deeply ingrained and inherent” and “neither transitory
nor temporary”).
89. See, e.g., Carcan˜o v. McCrory, No. 1:16CV236, 2016 WL 4508192, at *1 n.1
(M.D.N.C. Aug. 26, 2016) (accepting, for purposes of transgender plaintiffs’ motion for a
preliminary injunction allowing them to continue using restrooms consistent with their gen-
der identities, that “some transgender individuals form their gender identity misalignment at a
young age and exhibit distinct ‘brain structure, connectivity, and function’ that does not
match their birth sex”). Advocates also make use of medical expertise regarding gender
dysphoria in cases involving discriminatory denials of healthcare. See Brief Amici Curiae of
Transgender Legal Defense and Education Fund et al. in Support of Appellant, Tovar v. Essen-
tia Health, No. 16-3186 (8th Cir. Oct. 11, 2016), 2016 WL 6310514.
90. See G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 720 (4th Cir. 2016),
vacated and remanded, No. 16-273, 2017 WL 855755 (U.S. Mar. 6, 2017). The Fourth Circuit
concluded that the question of how to determine a child’s sex was left ambiguous by the
regulation, and so it deferred to the Department of Education’s interpretation that schools
should consider gender identity. Id. at 720–21.
91. Id. at 715.
92. Id. at 724.
93. Id. at 715.
94. Id.
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dysphoria and would result in “severe psychological distress.”95 In response
to the controversy over G.G., the school had constructed three single-stall
unisex restrooms.96 But G.G. argued that being required to use those facili-
ties would “make him feel even more stigmatized” because it would “set[ ]
him apart from his peers, and serve[ ] as a daily reminder that the school
views him as ‘different.’ ”97 As a result of his reluctance to use the restroom
at school, G.G. developed “multiple urinary tract infections.”98
These arguments were likely made to respond to the district judge’s
skepticism about the concept of gender dysphoria in general, and G.G.’s
gender dysphoria in particular.99 Medical expertise may be necessary to re-
but the idea that transgender identities are “lifestyle choices” that could be
discouraged, or that the appropriate medical response is to persuade a pa-
tient to embrace the gender associated with the sex he or she was assigned at
birth.100 This argument also has moral dimensions. As Attorney General
Lynch remarked in response to North Carolina’s HB2:
What we must not do—what we must never do—is turn on our neighbors,
our family members, our fellow Americans, for something they cannot con-
trol, and deny what makes them human. This is why none of us can stand
by when a state enters the business of legislating identity and insists that a
person pretend to be something they are not . . . .101
Part of the harm, on this account, is in forcing people to live inauthentic
lives.102
These harms are articulated to outweigh the privacy interests in segre-
gating restrooms based on biological notions of sex, as Yuracko explains (p.
96). It is here that her account of perfectionist concerns—a “belief that
95. Id. at 716.
96. Id. at 733 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 716–17 (majority opinion).
98. Id. at 717.
99. Id. at 726 (discussing comments at oral argument suggesting the judge thought it
might have mattered if G.G.’s gender identity was in “his mind” rather than having a “physi-
cal” cause, and the judge’s assertions that gender dysphoria itself was a “mental disorder,”
despite the attempts of counsel to explain that gender dysphoria does not become a disorder
unless it goes untreated).
100. For other views on this question, see, e.g., Paisley Currah, The Transgender Rights
Imaginary, in Feminist and Queer Legal Theory: Intimate Encounters, Uncomfortable
Conversations 245, 256 (Martha Albertson Fineman et al. eds., 2009) (arguing that, rather
than opposing the medical narrative of transgender identity, “the solution lies in ensuring that
the many, often conflicting, narratives of transgender identity that now appear in social and
legal arenas continue to circulate and proliferate”); Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine, Re/Model-
ing Gender, 18 Berkeley Women’s L.J. 15, 32 (2003) (discussing the practical need for legal
strategists to use medical knowledge to expand trans rights while “proceed[ing] with caution
and work[ing] to reduce the gatekeeping powers of medical experts over us”).
101. Lynch Remarks, supra note 13 (emphases added).
102. Part of the harm might also be rooted in libertarian resistance to state efforts to
legislate gender identity. And as discussed infra, part of the harm is also treating certain people
as less than human.
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human dignity and flourishing is tied to one’s ability to shield one’s body
and sexuality from unwanted and forced exposure”—has particular explana-
tory value (p. 116). The district judge in G.G. understood “G.G.’s claims of
stigma and distress” to be in conflict with “the privacy interests of the other
students protected by separate restrooms.”103 Drawing on cases involving
forced nudity in prisons, the court opined that “[m]ost people. . . have a
special sense of privacy in their own genitals, and involuntary exposure of
them in the presence of people of the other sex may be especially demeaning
and humiliating.”104 The distinction between G.G.’s use of the boys’ rest-
room and a prison strip search is that no student is forced to disrobe in full
view of others in a school restroom.105 Indeed, the school had added addi-
tional privacy strips to restroom stall doors and partitions between
urinals.106 The district judge, however, reasoned that “no amount of im-
provements to the urinals can make them completely private because people
sometimes turn while closing their pants.”107 Also at issue was a worry about
sexualization, phrased in terms of safety and child development. A dissent-
ing Fourth Circuit judge argued that these privacy concerns were “linked to
safety concerns that could arise from sexual responses prompted by stu-
dents’ exposure to the private body parts of students of the other biological
sex.”108 The school’s responsibility to protect students from this type of sex-
ualization was “particularly true in an environment where children are still
developing, both emotionally and physically.”109 The Fourth Circuit major-
ity challenged the assumption of universal heterosexuality behind this con-
cept of privacy, noting that “[t]he same safety concern would seem to
require segregated restrooms for gay boys and girls.”110
The district judge acknowledged that the concept of privacy operating
here was not literally about shielding genitals from exposure.111 Rather, the
issue was that some male students would not “be comfortable with [G.G.’s]
103. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 132 F. Supp. 3d 736, 750 (E.D. Va.
2015), rev’d in part and vacated in part, 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016).
104. Id. at 751 (quoting Lee v. Downs, 641 F.2d 1117, 1119 (4th Cir. 1981)).
105. See G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 723 n.10 (4th Cir.
2016), vacated and remanded, No. 16-273, 2017 WL 855755 (U.S. Mar. 6, 2017).
106. Id. at 716.
107. G.G., 132 F. Supp. 3d at 751.
108. G.G., 822 F.3d at 735 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 723–24 n.11 (majority opinion). In the HB2 litigation, the district judge pre-
liminarily rejected safety arguments on the grounds that prior to HB2, transgender individuals
had used sex segregated restrooms consistent with their gender identities without incident;
that public safety was protected by “the sustained validity of peeping, indecent exposure, and
trespass laws”; and that the evidence in the record indicated that jurisdictions that had enacted
rules allowing transgender individuals to use restrooms consistent with their gender identities
had not seen increased restroom crime by “non-transgender predators.” Carcan˜o v. McCrory,
No. 1:16CV236, 2016 WL 4508192, at *27 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 26, 2016).
111. G.G., 132 F. Supp. 3d at 751–52 (acknowledging that the privacy interests at issue
were not about “preventing most exposures of genitalia”).
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presence in the male restroom,” and, due to their embarrassment, these stu-
dents might feel compelled to use the school’s unisex restrooms.112 Yuracko’s
book helps us to understand the operative concept of privacy here as a per-
sonal one, protecting an individual’s (or community’s) autonomy to make
decisions about who will view him or her (or the community’s children) in
certain contexts.113 It is not about privacy in an objective sense. To decide on
questions of restroom access, courts weigh these personal privacy interests
against the interests of transgender students in using the facilities consistent
with their gender identities.
The emphasis on status in this balance of hardships could be cause for
concern for those who would prefer that the law challenge the assumptions
behind segregated spaces like restrooms, rather than assigning everyone to
either the girls’ or the boys’ room.114 But the changes wrought by the inte-
gration of transgender students may be in the direction of increased privacy
for all, ultimately reducing the need for sex segregation over the long term.
For example, Students & Parents for Privacy v. United States Department of
Education challenges a settlement between a school district and the Depart-
ment of Education allowing a transgender girl to use private spaces in a
communal girls’ locker room.115 The Department of Education’s investiga-
tion revealed that, even though the school’s changing facilities were sex-seg-
regated, many students still took steps to avoid exposure of their naked
bodies.116 Students did not shower fully naked, and some used a “buddy
system” while changing into or out of swimwear, having a friend hold up a
towel to create privacy, while others held towels in their mouths.117 As a
result of the Department of Education’s complaint, the school district
112. Id.; see also Carcan˜o, 2016 WL 4508192, at *3 (“It is also possible that sex-segregated
facilities protect against embarrassment from engaging in intimate bodily functions in the
immediate vicinity of the opposite sex, regardless of whether one’s body is subject to view.”).
113. P. 118. Yuracko offers the example of cases in which “courts respect elderly women’s
preferences to be cared for only by female nurses, even when the same women are simultane-
ously being treated by male doctors.” P. 118.
114. Arguments against sex-segregated restrooms include that they are sites of violence
against gender-nonconforming people; they reinforce the belief that sex is naturally binary;
they cause problems for families, especially fathers parenting daughters; they result in longer
wait times, most often for women; and they are based in heteronormative ideas of privacy.
115. Verified Complaint for Injunctive & Declaratory Relief, Students & Parents for Pri-
vacy v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 1:16-cv-04945 (N.D. Ill. May 4, 2016), 2016 WL 2591322.
116. Letter from Adele Rapport, Reg’l Dir., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office for Civil Rights, to
Daniel E. Cates, Superintendent, Twp. High Sch. Dist. 211, at 6 (Nov. 2, 2015), https://
www2.ed.gov/documents/press-releases/township-high-211-letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/
KGA2-95ML] (finding a school district in violation of Title IX for failing to allow a trans-
gender girl to use the girls’ locker room); see also Carcan˜o, 2016 WL 4508192, at *4 (discussing
the testimony of a North Carolina school district’s diversity officer who was, with respect to
locker rooms, “confident that the privacy interests of transgender and non-transgender stu-
dents alike could be accommodated through the same means used to accommodate any stu-
dent with body image or shyness issues”).
117. Letter from Adele Rapport to Daniel E. Cates, supra note 116, at 6.
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agreed to install “privacy curtains” in the girls’ locker rooms “to accommo-
date [the transgender student] and any other students who wish to be as-
sured of privacy while changing.”118 As spaces are reconfigured with
partitions, walls, and curtains, arguments for sex segregation may begin to
lose their force. The requirements of privacy may seem set in stone, but the
history of restroom architecture reveals variation in the configuration of
public and private spaces in response to changing gender norms.119
By contrast to the transgender rights cases, the sexual orientation cases
do not rest on any explicit status-protection rationale that would affirm the
immutability of lesbian, gay, or bisexual identities.120 The EEOC and those
district courts that have followed that agency’s interpretation have not used
any form of status-based reasoning in holding that sexual orientation dis-
crimination is, by definition, sex discrimination.121 One district court went
so far as to explain: “A plaintiff’s ‘actual’ sexual orientation is irrelevant to a
Title IX or Title VII claim because it is the biased mind of the alleged dis-
criminator that is the focus of the analysis.”122
118. Students & Parents for Privacy v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 16-cv-4945, 2016 WL
6134121, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 18, 2016) (report and recommendation of magistrate judge).
Under the policy, students who desired more privacy than that created by the changing sta-
tions in the communal locker room could use “separate, single-use facilities.” Id. at *23. In
recommending that the district court deny the plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction,
the magistrate judge concluded that the right to privacy does not “insulate[ ] a person from
coming into contact with someone who is different than they are, or who they fear will act in a
way that causes them to be embarrassed or uncomfortable, when there are alternative means
for both individuals to protect themselves from such contact, embarrassment, or discomfort.”
Id. at *24.
119. Laws requiring sex segregation of public restrooms were first enacted in the late nine-
teenth century to protect the “Victorian modesty” of working women entering the public
sphere, which “was threatened if a woman could even be seen entering the facility.” Terry S.
Kogan, Sex Separation: The Cure-All for Victorian Social Anxiety, in Toilet: Public
Restrooms and the Politics of Sharing, supra note 64, at 145, 159. Some laws went so far
as to require that women’s and men’s restrooms have “separate approaches.” Id. On university
campuses and in many cities today, “all-gender restrooms” are becoming ubiquitous. Aimee
Lee Ball, The Symbols of Change, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 2015, at ST1, http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/11/08/style/transgender-restroom-all-gender.html (on file with Michigan Law Review).
120. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), which recognized the constitutional
right to same-sex marriage, made a brief reference to the view of medical professionals that
sexual orientation is immutable, but its holding rested more on the immutable nature of mar-
riage as an institution than on the immutability of sexual orientation. See Clarke, supra note
43, at 4 n.2, 26–27 (discussing Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596). For an argument that the pre-
mise that sexual orientation is immutable is unscientific, unnecessary, and unjust, see Lisa M.
Diamond & Clifford J. Rosky, Scrutinizing Immutability: Research on Sexual Orientation and
U.S. Legal Advocacy for Sexual Minorities, 53 J. Sex Res. 363 (2016).
121. See Baldwin v. Foxx, No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641 (E.E.O.C. July 15, 2015); see
also EEOC v. Scott Med. Health Ctr., No. CV 16-225, 2016 WL 6569233 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 4,
2016); Winstead v. Lafayette Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 197 F. Supp. 3d 1334 (N.D. Fla. 2016);
Videckis v. Pepperdine Univ., 150 F. Supp. 3d 1151 (C.D. Cal. 2015); Issacs v. Felder Servs.,
LLC, 143 F. Supp. 3d 1190 (M.D. Ala. 2015).
122. Videckis, 150 F. Supp. 3d at 1159–60.
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But no circuit court has yet adopted the EEOC’s view. When confronted
with discrimination that could be based in both sexual orientation and gen-
der nonconformity, most courts attempt to draw a line between the two,123
an exercise that reinforces stereotypes in unexpected ways. In a 2006 case,
Vickers v. Fairfield Medical Center, a plaintiff subjected to anti-gay harass-
ment argued that his mistreatment was sex discrimination because, “in the
eyes of his co-workers, his sexual practices, whether real or perceived, did
not conform to the traditionally masculine role.”124 The Sixth Circuit held
this was not the sort of gender nonconformity protected by Title VII.125 It
reasoned that “Price Waterhouse focused principally on characteristics that
were readily demonstrable in the workplace, such as the plaintiff’s manner
of walking and talking at work, as well as her work attire and her hair-
style.”126 Vickers had not shown “his appearance or mannerisms on the job
were perceived as gender non-conforming in some way.”127 This limitation,
the court reasoned, was necessary, lest plaintiffs “bootstrap” protection for
sexual orientation into sex discrimination law, a result not intended by Con-
gress.128 By contrast, in Prowel v. Wise Business Forms, the Third Circuit al-
lowed a gay plaintiff to proceed on a sex stereotyping theory because his
coworkers had taken notice of his “effeminate” traits, including, among
other things, his high voice, manner of sitting with his legs crossed, and
interest in interior design.129 In his 2014 study of judicial opinions on sexu-
ality and sex discrimination, Brian Soucek concluded that the result of this
doctrine is that “employees who manifest traits coded as gay in observable
ways at work often succeed under Title VII,” but when the discrimination is
based only on the fact that a coworker knows or suspects a plaintiff is gay,
courts refuse to extend protection.130
Soucek argues that this doctrine gives workers incentives to “flaunt”
their sexual orientation by behaving in ways coded as gay if they want legal
protection, a dynamic that “might actually be bolstering perceived differ-
ences between gay and straight workers.”131 In a 2016 case, Hively v. Ivy Tech
123. Some circuit precedents might be interpreted as holding that any implication of sex-
ual orientation-based prejudice means a plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim fails. See Hively v.
Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698, 705–06 (7th Cir. 2016) (describing these cases as “essen-
tially throw[ing] out the baby with the bathwater”), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, No. 15-
1720, 2016 WL 6768628 (7th Cir. Oct. 11, 2016).
124. 453 F.3d 757, 763 (6th Cir. 2006).
125. Vickers, 453 F.3d at 763.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 764–65 (discussing Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 218 (2d Cir.
2005)).
129. 579 F.3d 285, 291–92 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding there were sufficient facts for a jury to
conclude “Prowel was harassed because he did not conform to Wise’s vision of how a man
should look, speak, and act—rather than harassment based solely on his sexual orientation”).
130. Brian Soucek, Perceived Homosexuals: Looking Gay Enough for Title VII, 63 Am. U. L.
Rev. 715, 718 (2014).
131. Id. at 783–85.
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Community College, the Seventh Circuit observed that this doctrine requires
that courts “attempt[ ] to identify behaviors that are uniquely attributable to
gay men and lesbians.”132 This “often lead[s] to strange discussions of sexual
orientation stereotypes,” such as whether speaking with a lisp is a stereotype
associated with women or gay men.133 The court recognized that it is “an
odd state of affairs” that Title VII only protects lesbian, gay, and bisexual
plaintiffs “to the extent that those plaintiffs meet society’s stereotypical
norms about how gay men or lesbian women look or act.”134 Echoing
Soucek’s conclusions,135 the court guessed that “neither the proponents nor
the opponents of protecting employees from sexual orientation discrimina-
tion would be satisfied with a body of case law that protects ‘flamboyant’ gay
men and ‘butch’ lesbians but not the lesbian or gay employee who acts and
appears straight.”136 Thus, the doctrine’s effect is to reaffirm, rather than
disrupt, essentialist understandings about the linkages between gender non-
conformity and marginalized sexual orientations. Although the court was
concerned with this absurdity, it did not see a sufficiently “compelling rea-
son” to reverse its many past decisions holding that sexual orientation and
sex discrimination must be distinguished.137 But it acknowledged that
“[p]erchance, in time, these inconsistencies will come to be seen as defying
practical workability and will lead us to reconsider our precedent.”138 At the
time of this writing, the Seventh Circuit is reconsidering the Hively
decision.139
132. 830 F.3d 698, 709 (7th Cir. 2016), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, No. 15-1720,
2016 WL 6768628 (7th Cir. Oct. 11, 2016).
133. Hively, 830 F.3d at 709 (discussing Anderson v. Napolitano, No. 09–60744–CIV,
2010 WL 431898, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2010)).
134. Id. at 711.
135. Soucek, supra note 130, at 786 (“What this discussion shows is that courts, faced with
the Title VII dilemma, yet uncomfortable with the treatment some gays and lesbians experi-
ence in the workplace, have crafted a largely unnoticed, de facto [Employment Non-Discrimi-
nation Act (ENDA)] of their own. It is an ENDA that no imaginable Congress would pass.
And . . . it is quite possibly an ENDA that we should not want.”). ENDA was a proposed law
that would have prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
136. Hively, 830 F.3d at 715.
137. Id. at 718.
138. Id.
139. It is possible that a new decision could rest on status-protection arguments. At the en
banc oral argument, Judge Posner hinted at an immutability rationale by suggesting that the
cause of “lesbianism” is “genetic, or biological, or maybe early childhood effects,” rather than
a “casual . . . sort of choice.” Oral Argument at 38:00 to 39:30, Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll.,
No. 15-1720 (7th Cir. argued Nov. 30, 2016), http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/2016/nr.15-
1720.15-1720_11_30_2016.mp3 [https://perma.cc/FY7Q-SM79]. He went so far as to ask
whether the immutability of sexual orientation meant that lesbians were a “different sex” than
other women. Id. at 38:09. In Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 655 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J.),
the Seventh Circuit adopted immutability arguments about sexual orientation in striking
down statutes banning same-sex marriage. See Clarke, supra note 43, at 34–35 (criticizing
Baskin v. Bogan’s reliance on immutability).
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C. Antisubordination
Instead of a theory of protection for immutable status, recent cases are
beginning to follow another path: bolstering neutrality arguments with vari-
ations on antisubordination ideas. While Yuracko is somewhat optimistic
about the power of antisubordination theories to challenge gender conven-
tions, she regards them as limited with respect to gender nonconformity
(pp. 87–88). This is because the version of antisubordination that she sees
manifested in the case law is, for the most part, concerned only with harms
to women as a group relative to men as a group. But new versions of the
antisubordination argument have emerged in cases brought by LGBT plain-
tiffs. These cases recognize that sex discrimination law protects everyone
from subordinating sex-based classifications, not just women.140 This Sec-
tion will explain how these cases (1) see subordination in sex-based classifi-
cations that stigmatize LGBT people as less worthy of dignity or respect, and
(2) acknowledge how sexism, heterosexism, and transphobia intersect as
subordinating systems of bias.141
Sex discrimination can stigmatize groups other than “women.” The
cases brought by transgender plaintiffs exhibit concern about stigma: the
ways that discrimination can brand its targets with a “spoiled identity.”142
“The harm of stigma is that a single perceived characteristic is seen as ‘dis-
qualifying’ the whole person, excluding him or her from membership in the
community that calls itself the ‘normals.’ ”143 This exclusion allows a com-
munity to set certain people aside and “treat[ ] them as not quite human”144
or as “less worthy of equal concern or respect” than others.145 The concept
of constitutionally impermissible attributions of stigma has an extensive
pedigree in the law of race discrimination,146 and has recently played a role
140. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 85, 122. In Hively, the Seventh Circuit panel
clarified that it recognizes that “ ‘Title VII protects persons, not classes’ and that anyone can
pursue a claim under Title VII no matter what her gender or sexual orientation or that of her
harasser.” 830 F.3d at 707–08. This recognition may underscore the Hively court’s dissatisfac-
tion with a doctrine that protects only gender-nonconforming lesbian, gay, and bisexual work-
ers. See supra text accompanying notes 127–139.
141. My aim here is to trace the emergence of these theories in the cases and to provide
some theoretical context for them. This Review does not attempt a complete defense of these
theories.
142. See Erving Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity
2–3 (Simon & Schuster 1986) (1963).
143. Kenneth L. Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits of Race and Sexual
Orientation, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 263, 286 (1995) (quoting Goffman, supra note 142, at 2–5).
144. Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 Ga. L. Rev. 245, 249 (1983).
145. Deborah Hellman, Equal Protection in the Key of Respect, 123 Yale L.J. 3036, 3044–47
(2014) (discussing debates over the concept of stigma in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483 (1954), and advancing a theory of discrimination as socially or institutionally empowered
practices that express that certain people “are less worthy of equal concern or respect”).
146. See, e.g., R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Con-
text, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 803, 864–78 (2004) (tracing the concept of stigma through the Su-
preme Court’s cases on race discrimination and equal protection).
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in the Supreme Court’s same-sex marriage cases.147 Stigmatizing practices
concern antisubordination theory because they contribute to systems of
group-based hierarchy in which members of the stigmatized group are ren-
dered a lower caste and systematically denied equal opportunity.148
Stigma does important work in G.G. The Fourth Circuit described a
school board meeting regarding G.G.’s use of the boys’ restroom as follows:
Some speakers threatened to vote the Board members out of office if the
Board members voted against the proposed policy. Speakers again referred
to G.G. as a “girl” or “young lady.” One speaker called G.G. a “freak” and
compared him to a person who thinks he is a “dog” and wants to urinate
on fire hydrants. Following this second comment period, the Board voted
6–1 to adopt the proposed policy, thereby barring G.G. from using the
boys’ restroom at school.149
Despite this context, the district court regarded G.G.’s argument about
stigma as an expression of his own “feel[ings].”150 Failing to understand the
social meaning of the Board’s policy as demeaning to G.G., the district court
equated G.G.’s stigmatization with the inconvenience of those male students
who might have felt compelled to use the unisex restroom to avoid G.G.151 A
concurring Fourth Circuit judge, however, saw an obvious difference: “For
other students, using the single-stall restrooms carries no stigma whatsoever,
whereas for G.G., using those same restrooms is tantamount to humiliation
and a continuing mark of difference among his fellow students.”152 It is not
147. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (“[L]aws excluding same-sex
couples from the marriage right impose stigma and injury of the kind prohibited by our basic
charter.”); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (“The avowed purpose and
practical effect of the [Defense of Marriage Act is] to impose a disadvantage, a separate status,
and so a stigma on all who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned
authority of the States.”).
148. Cf. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability”, 86 Va. L. Rev. 397,
444–45 (2000) (discussing how stigmatizing practices construct the category of “disability”
and lead to systematic denials of opportunity that mark the group of people with disabilities as
a “dependent caste”).
149. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 716 (4th Cir. 2016)
(citations omitted), vacated and remanded, No. 16-273, 2017 WL 855755 (U.S. Mar. 6, 2017).
150. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 132 F. Supp. 3d 736, 752 (E.D. Va.
2015) (holding that G.G.’s declaration had “fail[ed] to articulate the specific harms that would
occur to him if he uses [the unisex] restrooms while this litigation proceeds” because “it sim-
ply sa[id] that using these restrooms would cause him distress and make him feel stigma-
tized”), rev’d in part and vacated in part, 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016).
151. Id. (“It does not occur to G.G. that other students may experience feelings of exclu-
sion when they can no longer use the restrooms they were accustomed to using because they
feel that G.G.’s presence in the male restroom violates their privacy.”). G.G. had in fact used
the boys’ restroom for seven weeks without hearing any complaints from other students. Id. at
740, 751. But the district judge speculated that “[i]t would not be surprising if students, rather
than confronting G.G. himself, expressed their discomfort to their parents who then went to
the School Board.” Id. at 751.
152. G.G., 822 F.3d at 729 (Davis, J., concurring).
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that unisex restrooms are inherently stigmatizing. Rather, in this social con-
text, requiring a transgender student to use unisex restrooms denies his gen-
der identity and is a discriminatory practice linked to the systematic denial
of the humanity of transgender people.
As the Department of Justice’s complaint against North Carolina ar-
gued, “[C]ompliance with and implementation of H.B. 2 stigmatizes and
singles out transgender employees, results in their isolation and exclusion,
and perpetuates a sense they are not worthy of equal treatment and re-
spect.”153 In her speech about HB2, Attorney General Lynch drew a connec-
tion to Jim Crow–era policies, arguing that “[i]t was not so very long ago
that states, including North Carolina, had signs above restrooms, water
fountains and on public accommodations keeping people out based upon a
distinction without a difference.”154 Lynch implored, “Let us not act out of
fear and misunderstanding, but out of the values of inclusion, diversity and
regard for all that make our country great.”155 The use of restroom policies
to stigmatize transgender students and workers is thus analogized to racial
stigma, although it is not a form of race discrimination. It is a form of sex
discrimination because it uses sex classifications to subordinate transgender
people.
The recent sexual orientation cases include antisubordination threads of
a different nature, in the form of arguments linking heterosexism to social
systems of subordination based on sex.156 To be sure, the EEOC’s Baldwin v.
Foxx decision relied on neutrality arguments and neglected to articulate how
sexual orientation discrimination relates to sexism.157 But the intersections
have not been lost on federal courts. Because gender stereotypes and dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation are tightly intertwined, many
courts have expressed frustration with the “exceptionally difficult” task of
drawing a line between them.158 Courts are beginning to give up.159 This is
not just because a legal test has proven unmanageable. It is also because
153. Complaint at 9, United States v. North Carolina, 192 F. Supp. 3d 620 (M.D.N.C.
2016) (No. 1:16-cv-00425), 2016 WL 2730796.
154. Lynch Remarks, supra note 13.
155. Id.
156. Legal theorists have long advanced such arguments. See, e.g., Koppelman, supra note
57, at 234–55; Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L.
Rev. 187, 187.
157. See Recent Adjudication, Employment Law—Title VII—EEOC Extends Work-Place
Protections to Gay and Lesbian Employees—Complainant v. Foxx, No. 0120133080, 2015 WL
4397641 (E.E.O.C. July 15, 2015), 129 Harv. L. Rev. 618, 620–25 (2015) (making this point).
158. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698, 709 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing cases from
various circuits reflecting on the elusiveness of this distinction), vacated and reh’g en banc
granted, No. 15-1720 (7th Cir. Oct. 11, 2016); Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 167 F.
Supp. 3d 598, 619 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (citing more such examples), appeal docketed, No. 16-748
(2d Cir. Mar. 9, 2016).
159. Videckis v. Pepperdine Univ., 150 F. Supp. 3d 1151, 1159 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (“Simply
put, the line between sex discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination is ‘difficult to
draw’ because that line does not exist, save as a lingering and faulty judicial construct.”).
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courts are connecting sexual orientation–based discrimination with ascrip-
tion of traditional gender roles. As the Seventh Circuit explained:
Discrimination against gay, lesbian, and bisexual employees comes about
because their behavior is seen as failing to comply with the quintessential
gender stereotype about what men and women ought to do—for example,
that men should have romantic and sexual relationships only with women,
and women should have romantic and sexual relationships only with
men. . . . Lesbian women and gay men upend our gender paradigms by
their very status—causing us to question and casting into doubt antiquated
and anachronistic ideas about what roles men and women should play in
their relationships. Who is dominant and who is submissive? Who is
charged with earning a living and who makes a home? Who is a father and
who a mother? In this way the roots of sexual orientation discrimination
and gender discrimination wrap around each other inextricably.160
Drawing similar connections in support of the argument that sexual orienta-
tion discrimination is sex discrimination, one district court cited Weinberger
v. Wiesenfeld,161 a 1975 sex discrimination case rejecting the “ ‘archaic and
overbroad’ generalization . . . that male workers’ earnings are vital to the
support of their families, while the earnings of female wage earners do not
significantly contribute to their families’ support.”162 Wiesenfeld was an
equal protection case brought by a father denied widow’s benefits.163 The
Supreme Court’s equal protection precedents target stereotypes about both
men and women because “[s]tereotypes about women’s domestic roles are
reinforced by parallel stereotypes presuming a lack of domestic responsibili-
ties for men.”164 It is not just that these stereotypes threaten one’s liberty to
choose a life free of predetermined roles; it is that they “create[ ] a self-
fulfilling cycle of discrimination” that locks women out of the workplace
and reinforces their subordinate status.165 More courts may one day be per-
suaded by neutrality arguments against sex-differentiated treatment, along-
side this thicker understanding of the ways heterosexism reinforces gender
roles and subordinating social hierarchies.
160. Hively, 830 F.3d at 705–06.
161. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
162. Winstead v. Lafayette Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 197 F. Supp. 3d 1334, 1345 (N.D.
Fla. 2016) (quoting Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 643).
163. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 639–41.
164. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736–37 (2003) (holding that,
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress may enact a gender-neutral family leave
law to remedy state discrimination in providing only maternity, but not paternity leave).
165. Id. at 736; see also id. at 729 (linking these stereotypes to the long history of laws
excluding women from employment opportunities); Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping
Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 83, 120 (2010) (discuss-
ing how, in the 1970s, “[a]nti-stereotyping arguments enabled [then-women’s rights advocate
Ruth Bader] Ginsburg to foreground the state’s enforcement of the male breadwinner-female
caregiver model—a set of practices that was not visible in the canonical race discrimination
cases but had long entrenched women’s secondary status in the American legal system.”).
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Might such arguments be of use to plaintiffs like Darlene Jespersen? On
the one hand, many judges may continue to see conventional gendered
grooming requirements as too trivial to implicate concerns about systemic
social stigma or gender roles.166 On the other hand, as a dissenting judge in
Jespersen wrote: “The inescapable message [of the makeup requirement] is
that women’s undoctored faces compare unfavorably to men’s, not because
of a physical difference between men’s and women’s faces, but because of a
cultural assumption—and gender-based stereotype—that women’s faces are
incomplete, unattractive, or unprofessional without full makeup.”167 Femi-
nists have long argued that such gender-based stereotypes stem from a sexist
ideology in which women are judged primarily for their appearances.
Whether this argument has any cultural traction in an era in which a former
beauty-pageant owner has been elected President of the United States is un-
certain. But perhaps it might gain legal plausibility as LGBT litigants show
there is nothing to fear from challenges to sex classifications.
Conclusion
Gender Nonconformity and the Law is an essential book for anyone wish-
ing to understand recent developments in the law of sex discrimination.
While normative assessment is not the book’s main purpose, it offers the
important warning that status-protection arguments will only lead to pro-
tection for conventional and binary versions of masculinity and femininity,
rather than a wider range of gender possibilities. This Review illustrates that,
while status-protection arguments have been in the background of recent
legal victories for LGBT plaintiffs, the cases also evince reliance on neutrality
arguments and variations of the antisubordination principle. Courts, advo-
cates, and scholars might further develop and refine these antisubordination
ideas to advance the sex discrimination argument against anti-LGBT bias. It
remains possible, though, that the doctrine will revert to the lodestar of
status protection. It is also possible that recent progress will be reversed as a
new presidential administration directs executive agencies to cede the terrain
entirely to individual employers and local school districts. In any event, as
advocates and courts push the law of sex stereotyping to new frontiers, they
would be wise to consider Yuracko’s warning about the dangers of status-
based understandings of equality, and to ask whether there might be other
paths forward.
166. The panel opinion in Hively suggests grooming is trivial in its lament:
Title VII leaves us with a somewhat odd body of case law that protects a lesbian who faces
discrimination because she fails to meet some superficial gender norms—wearing pants
instead of dresses, having short hair, not wearing make up—but not a lesbian who meets
cosmetic gender norms, but violates the most essential of gender stereotypes by marrying
another woman.
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698, 715 (7th Cir. 2016), vacated and reh’g en banc
granted, No. 15-1720 (7th Cir. Oct. 11, 2016).
167. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1116 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc)
(Pregerson, J., dissenting).
